PHIL2400 Draft Tutorial Paper Questions

The following is a DRAFT of my tutorial paper question and answer for PHIL240: Ethics and the Passions.

Books II through IV of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics provide a setting in which ideas relating to the causal and metaphysical natures of the Passions are discussed. Prior to Aristotle, Plato argued for an oppositional framework in which to understand the causal and ethical relationships between the Passions and our reactions to them. Plato argued that the Passions and our reactions to them, our intellectual or ethical reactions, are at least two distinct epistemological entities. For Plato the Passions are not dissimilar to his metaphysical 'black horse' and are to be avoided or, where necessary, brought under the control of human intellect. Does Aristotle continue Plato's oppositional epistemology or does he suggest a new or modified framework for understanding the relationships between the Passions and our responses to them?

I would argue that Aristotle completely revolutionises concepts relating to the Passions and our reactions to them. Aristotle argues that Plato is completely mistaken when placing the Passions into a separate and oppositional class relative to human intellect. Plato conceived of the soul, or the self, as being composed of parts; there are rational parts and there are passionate parts for example. Aristotle disagrees with the Platonic model arguing for a single soul that is hierarchical in nature. This hierarchy can be observed in nature where the qualities of the Human include the qualities of a given animal, however, the reverse is not the case for humans possess at least one superior quality to any given animal, namely a rational intellect. Therefore when a passion is triggered it does not summon a separate rational epistemological entity as it would under a Platonic theory. Under the Aristotelian model the Passions and our intellectual responses to them are of the same epistemological kind. Our intellectual, and therefore ethical, reactions to our Passions under Aristotle are simply phenomena of the Passions.

The implications of this position are made apparent in book II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Because the Passions are no longer entities that require avoidance nor entities that exist in opposition to intellectual responses they can be viewed as acceptable, and even desirable, aspects of Human nature. The Passions, therefore, can be incorporated as a valuable part of Aristotle's teleology rather than being separate from it. True excellence, virtue and ethical action shifts from mastery over the Passions in Plato to developing Passions in the correct way in Aristotle. Aristotle argues that the Passions are value free, they have no intrinsic ethical virtue, and that their ethical value is entirely dependant upon our intellectual responses to them.