PHIL2400 Tutorial Paper Questions (Revised)

The Following is a revised version of my Tutorial Paper for PHIL2400: Ethics and the Passions.  I'll post the final version in the Uni Papers section of this site on Thursday.

Books II through IV of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics provide a setting in which ideas relating to the causal and metaphysical natures of the Passions are discussed. Prior to Aristotle, Plato argued for an oppositional framework in which to understand the causal and ethical relationships between the Passions and our reactions to them. Plato argued that the Passions and our reactions to them, our intellectual or ethical reactions, are at least two distinct epistemological entities (Phaedo 64-66). For Plato the Passions are not dissimilar to his metaphysical 'black horse' and are to be avoided or, where necessary, brought under the control of human intellect¹. Does Aristotle continue Plato's oppositional epistemology or does he suggest a new or modified framework for understanding the relationships between the Passions and our responses to them?

I would argue that Aristotle completely revolutionises concepts relating to the Passions and our reactions to them. Aristotle argues that Plato is completely mistaken when placing the Passions into a separate and oppositional class relative to human intellect (De Anima 432b). Plato conceived of the soul, or the self, as being composed of parts; there are rational parts and there are passionate parts for example (Phaedo 78–80, Republic 437). Aristotle disagrees with the Platonic model arguing for a single soul that is hierarchical in nature (De Anima 413a). This hierarchy can be observed in the natural world where the qualities of the Human include the qualities of a given animal, however, the reverse is not the case for humans possess at least one superior quality to any given animal, namely a rational intellect. Therefore when a passion is triggered² it does not summon a separate rational epistemological entity as it would under a Platonic theory. Under the Aristotelian model the Passions and our intellectual responses to them are of the same epistemological kind. Our intellectual, and therefore ethical, reactions to our Passions under Aristotle are simply like phenomena of the same epistemological entity.

The implications of this position are made apparent in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Because the Passions are no longer entities that require avoidance nor entities that exist in opposition to intellectual responses they can be viewed as acceptable, and even desirable, aspects of Human nature. The Passions, therefore, can be incorporated as a valuable part of Aristotle's teleology rather than being separate from it. True excellence, virtue and ethical action shifts from mastery over and avoidance of the Passions in Plato to developing the Passions in the correct way in Aristotle³. Aristotle argues that the Passions are value free, they have no intrinsic ethical virtue, and that their ethical value is dependant upon our intellectual responses to them (Nicomachean Ethics 1105a19–1107a2).

There are seeming contradictions, however, to this last claim within the Nicomachean Ethics. Section 1107a9-26 argues that some Passions such as spite and envy are intrinsically bad. In light of Aristotle's argument that excellence is realised through developing the Passions and maintaining a mean based equilibrium with them how can Passions such as spite and envy be incorporated? Are they, in fact, Passions as Aristotle views them⁴?

1. See Plato's Phaedrus 246-254 for discussion of the 'Black Horse' allegory.

2. Trigger is my term, not Aristotle's.

3. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, books II – IV, describe the process of using the intellect to develop the Passions in a way that enhances the Excellences.

4. See Nicomachean Ethics 1005b19-28 for Aristotle's definition of the Passions.

References

Aristotle, De Anima, Trans. J. A. Smith, Viewed 29 February 2008, <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Aristotle/De-anima/>

Aristotle 1984, ''Nicomachean Ethics', in J Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 1742-1781.

Plato, Phaedo, Trans. B Jowett, Viewed 29 February 2008, <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedo.html>.

Plato 1968, The Republic: The Complete and Unabridged Translation, Trans. B Jowett, Airmont Publishing Company, New York.