Ethics

Nicholas Agar, in his paper 'Designing Babies: Morally Permissible Ways to Modify the Human Genome', argues that while therapeutic genetic engineering is generally regarded as morally acceptable, it is a mistake to regard all forms of eugenic genetic engineering as morally abhorrent. I disagree with this position of Agar's and in the following paper I illustrate where his paper is weak and I present an argument why any form of genetic intervention, except in the most extreme circumstances, is morally impermissible.

The question of whether abortion is a morally permissible action is something that has inspired a wide range of debate. Much of the work in this regard has focused upon two concepts. Primarily the rights of the fetus have been the centre of discussion, with a great deal of focus placed upon whether the fetus is either a human and/or a person. More recently, however, a lot of work has focused upon the rights of the mother, particularly exploring the moral status of her decisions relative to the moral status of the fetus that she carries. In the first instance above, the premise sought is whether the fetus is a member of the moral community and, therefore, whether abortion should be considered murder and morally wrong. The second instance explores the moral status of the mother, someone who is already a person, and what moral implications, if any, result from the consequences of her decisions in relation to the fetus she is carrying. I focus in the following paper upon the first case alone. I will show that focusing upon personhood in deciding the moral permissibility of abortions is flawed and leads to the collapse of both arguments for and against abortion that depend upon it.