The Path to Moksha: A Comparison Between Vaiṣṇava and Jaina Traditions

In the following paper I compare the paths to moksha (मोक) within Hindu and Jaina (जैन) traditions. As both Hindu and Jaina philosophy are diverse phenomena I focus solely upon Vaiṣṇava (वैषणव) philosophy in the Hindu context and orthodox Jaina philosophy. I further limit the Vaiṣṇava context to the Bhagavad-Gītā (भगवद गीता) or Gītopaniṣad (गीतोपिनषद् )¹.

'Hinduism' is, as illustrated by Weightman (1998, p. 261), a 'complex religious tradition which has evolved organically in the Indian subcontinent over several thousand years...', with orthodox Jaina philosophy being divided into at least two (similar) schools of thought, Digambara (िदगंबर) and Shvetambara (शेताबर) (Folkert & Cort 1998, pp. 340-344). It is with this in mind that I have narrowed this comparison down to Vaiṣṇava philosophy, in particular the concepts discussed in the Bhagavad-Gītā, and orthodox Jaina philosophy.

Moksha, or the liberation from saṃsāra (संसार), is the final goal of both Jaina and Vaiṣṇava philosophy (Folkert & Cort 1998, pp. 346-350; Weightman 1998, pp. 266-267). Both the Vaiṣṇava and Jaina traditions understand that the human form of life is the vehicle through which moksha can be attained (Bhagavad-Gītā 3.16; Soni 2000, p. 369). The processes through which the human must go through, and in some cases which 'type' or sex of person is eligible to attain moksha, differs between the two traditions. The process of attaining moksha from within the orthodox Jaina tradition rests upon the observance of a strict and ascetic discipline that the religious practitioner enforces upon himself or herself (Soni 2000, p. 369). Jaina philosophy argues that the self (jiva) is inhibited by karma, a subtle form of matter that is associated with each jiva. The effect of karma upon each jiva is what inhibits the jiva's attainment of moksha; the removal of the jiva's relationship with both karma and ajiva (non-sentient existent things) is what allows the jiva to attain moksha (Folkert & Cort 1998, p. 347). Jaina philosophy argues that this removal of the relationship and consequent effects of karma is attained through the practice of asceticism and renunciation (Folkert & Cort 1998, p. 347; Dundas 2005, p. 4768).

This belief is mirrored, to a certain extent, in the Vaiṣṇava philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gītā². Chapter thirteen, verse thirty five, has Kṛṣṇa state:

kṣetra-kṣetrajñayor evam
antaraṃ jñāna-cakṣuṣā
bhūta-prakṛti-mokṣaṃ ca
ye vidur yānti te param

Those who see with eyes of knowledge the difference between the body and the knower of the body, and can also understand the process of liberation from bondage in material nature, attain to the supreme goal.

This verse illustrates a similarity with the Jaina view that there is a fundamental difference between sentient and non-sentient existent things and that there is a relative process to undertake to achieve moksha. This process, however, is vastly different between the two traditions.

As I mentioned above the orthodox Jaina position is that moksha will be attained via asceticism and renunciation. Renouncing worldly attachments will gradually lessen the hold that karma has over the jiva who will then be able to attain moksha. The philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gītā also recommends asceticism and renunciation, but with important qualifications. The final chapter (chapter eighteen) of the Bhagavad-Gītā is situated around a discourse whereby Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa what the purpose of renunciation is. The third verse of this chapter sees Kṛṣṇa reply:

tyājyaṃ doṣa-vad ity eke
karma prāhur manīṣiṇaḥ
yajña-dāna-tapaḥ-karma
na tyājyam iti cāpare

Some learned men declare that all kinds of fruitive activities should be given up as faulty, yet other sages maintain that acts of sacrifice, charity and penance should never be abandoned.

Kṛṣṇa goes on to explain that the latter is the correct position to hold in his opinion as it is  due to the human condition that we act within the world and to not do so is illusory (Bhagavad-Gītā 18.59, 18.60). This particular question was almost certainly considered in early Jaina philosophy with the split into the Digambara and Shvetambara schools being based upon what activities were and were not permissible for the renunciate. The Digambara believing that all that can be given up should be given up (including clothing – hence the name: Digambara = 'sky clad') with the Shvetambara being more lenient (Dundas 2005, p. 4765; Folkert & Cort 1998, p. 343).

The process of renunciation leading to moksha is stated in very simple terms in the Bhagavad-Gītā, chapter eighteen, verse sixty six. Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna:

sarva-dharmān parityajya
mām ekaṃ śaraṇaṃ vraja
ahaṃ tvā sarva-pāpebhyo
mokṣyayiṣyāmi mā śucaḥ

Abandon all varieties of religion and just surrender unto Me. I shall deliver you from all sinful reactions. Do not fear.

This process of surrender in the Bhagavad-Gītā is phenomenologically different for different individuals, even though the same goal (moksha) is desired. Sanatana Goswami's Hari-Bhakti-Vilāsa (11.676) illustrates this point showing that the individual should perform whatever occupational duty is appropriate for their social standing and ability, but that all activity must be conducted with bhakti, or devotion to Hari (God). This process is something very alien to orthodox Jaina philosophy as there is no personal God in which to devote one's self, nor a God or gods who may intervene in human affairs (Folkert & Cort 1998, pp. 246-350).

The Vaiṣṇava philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gītā and the orthodox Jaina philosophy that I have discussed share both similarities and differences in their approach to moksha. Both possess the view that there is an important phenomenological difference between the self and all other matter, and that liberation from the material world is both possible, through a proper understanding and limiting of the relationship of self and matter, and desirable. Whereas the Vaiṣṇava philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gītā has the individual surrender to God, and dependent upon God's deliverance of moksha, orthodox Jaina philosophy, however, places the responsibility of moksha solely in the hands of the individual who must battle against the effects of karma through the practice of asceticism and renunciation.

Notes

1. All quotations from the Bhagavad-Gītā will be from the A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami translation listed in the reference list.

2. Karma is not seen, however, as a subtle form of matter in Vaiṣṇava philosophy but as 'material activities, for which one incurs subsequent reactions' (A.C Bhaktvedanta Swami 1986, p. 872).

References

A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami 1986, Bhagavad-Gītā As It Is, Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, Botany.

Dundas, P 2005, 'Jainism' in Lindsay Jones (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 7, 2nd edn, Macmillan Reference, Detroit, pp. 4764 – 4772.

Folkert, K.W & Cort, J.E 1998 'Jainism' in Hinnells, J.R (ed.), The New Penguin Handbook of Living Religions, Penguin Books, Camberwell, pp. 340 – 368.

Sanatana Goswami (n.d.), Hari-Bhakti-Vilāsa, Iskcon Media, <http://www.archive.org/download/iskconmedia_acaryas/Sanatana_Goswami_Hari_Bhakti_vilasa_full.pdf>.

Soni, J 2000, 'Basic Jaina Epistemology', in Philosophy East & West, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 367-311.

Weightman, S 1998 'Hinduism' in Hinnells, J.R (ed.), The New Penguin Handbook of Living Religions, Penguin Books, Camberwell, pp. 261 – 309.